Dawson, Moses
William H. Harrison:
p. 89.
he knows that they are brave. My Children, he has men armed with all kinds of weapons; those who live on the big waters and in the big towns, understand the use of muskets and bayonets, and those who live on this side the mountains use the same arms that you do.
My Children, the Great Spirit has taught your fathers to make all the arms and ammunition which they use; but you do not understand this art; if you should go to war with your fathers, who would supply you with those things? The British cannot; we have driven them beyond the lakes, and they cannot send a trader to you without our permission.
My Children, open your eyes to your true interests; your father wishes you to be happy. If you wish to have your minds set at ease, come and speak to him.
My Children, the young man who carries this is my friend, and he will speak to you in my name; listen to him as if I were to address you, and treat him with kindness and hospitality."
A few days after the departure of captain Prince and the Wea chief, the Governor received a letter from the former, stating, that shortly after the chief, Lapousier had left Vincennes, he received information that the Miamis, in the neighborhood of Fort Wayne, meditated some mischief to the whites. From the reiterated assurances which the Governor had received from Mr. Wells, he would have been led to discredit this report; but being aware of the deep dissimulation of which the Indians were capable, he received these specious declarations with caution, and took his measures so as to prepare against the actual commencement of hostilities, by organizing and disciplining the militia, and such other preparation as he considered requisite on the occasion.
By the report of captain Prince, on his return from his mission, it appeared that much of the rumor of the threatened hostilities of the Indians was unfounded. On an interview with the Kickapoo, Renard's son, to whom he had been recommended by the Governor, he discovered that the belt and speech, sent to the Weas by the Kickapoos, were concerning a young man of the Wea tribe, who had been murdered by a Kickapoo- that the latter tribe had deputed this young man, the son of Renard, to meet the Governor, and explain to him- that he told captain Prince, that the story of the intended hostile movement of his tribe was a fabrication of the Weas, and offered to point out to him the very persons who had raised the report, and that the same persons had told the Kickapoos that the United States were about to commence war upon them (the Kickapoos.)
Captain Prince also reported, that the Potawatamies of Shipois and Tippecanoe, had received an invitation to join a war party on the Illinois river, against the Osages; but the declined
Dawson, Moses
William H. Harrison:
p. 130.
Such was the perfect satisfaction given to the government of the United States (under both the former and present administration,) in all his negotiations and treaties with the Indians hitherto, that Governor Harrison seems to have had the entire confidence of the present executive as well as the former, and every possible dependence was placed in his prudence and integrity. He received a letter from the secretary at war, expressive of the fullest approbation of his conduct, and requesting of him his opinion as to the best mode of defence for the western country in case of war; to which he made the following reply, which, containing much important information, as well on the subject of the Shawanese prophet, as on the proper disposition of troops and the erection of forts, &c. for the protection of the western frontier, is given entire. It is dated Vincennes, 5th July, 1809.
"To the Honorable William Eustis, Secretary at War.
"SIR,
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of the 5th ultimo. The President's and your own approbation of my conduct is highly gratifying to me, and permit me to assure you, sir, that not exertions shall be waiting on my part, to merit a continuation of the confidence of the administration.
The Shawanese prophet and about 40 followers arrived here about a week ago. He denies most strenuously any participation in the late combination to attack our settlements, which he says was entirely confined to the tribes of the Mississippi and Illinois rivers; and he claims the merit of having prevailed upon them to relinquish their intentions.
I must confess that my suspicions of his guilt have been rather strengthened than diminished at every interview I have had with him since his arrival. He acknowledges that he received an invitation to war against us, from the British, last fall, and that he was apprised of the intentions of the Sacks, Foxes, &c. early in the spring, and warmly solicited to join in their league. But he could give no satisfactory explanation of his neglecting to communicate to me circumstances so extremely interesting to us, and towards which, I had, a few months before, directed his attention, and received a solemn assurance of his cheerful compliance with the injunctions I had impressed upon him.
The result of all my enquiries on the subject, is, that the late combination was produced by British intrigue and influence, in anticipation of war between them and the United States. It was, however, premature and ill judged, and the event sufficiently manifests a great decline in their influence, or in the talents and address, with which they have been accustomed to manage their Indian relations.
The warlike and well armed tribes of the Potawatamies, Ottawas, Chippewas, Delawares, and Miamies, I believe neither
Dawson, Moses
William H. Harrison:
p. 131.
had, nor would have joined in the combination; and although the Kickapoos, whose warriors are better than those of any other tribe, the remnant of the Wyandot excepted, are much under the influence of the prophet. I am persuaded that they were never made acquainted with his intentions, if these were really hostile to the United States.
As you do me the honor to request my opinion with respect to the troops destined to protect the western frontiers, I will communicate the result of my reflections with great pleasure.
Such is the nature of Indian warfare, that I am persuaded that one hundred thousand men would not be able to form a cordon along the frontiers of this territory, Michigan, and the state of Ohio, sufficiently compact to preserve our settlements from their desultory attacks in case of a general combination of the north-western tribes against us; and any fort, which is built with a view to form any part of such a line of defence, would, in my opinion, be useless. The chain of forts began by general St. Clair, and completed by general Wayne, extending into the Indian country from the Ohio, and which were so situated as to cover the settlements from any attack but that of Indians, afforded not the least security to the inhabitants, and were nor further useful than as resting places for the small convoys which were employed to throw in provisions for the campaign at the head of the line. As we have no elevation in the whole of what was the north-western territory, that could be designated by the name of mountain, we have consequently no difficult passes, such as the ancient world, and some of the Atlantic states afford; the securing of which, would necessarily command the country for a considerable extent. There are, however, military positions to be found, which, if properly improved, would not only prevent the ingress of any regular force, but would effectually keep the Indians in check. These are to be sought for along the great water courses which bound the country on either sides, and in those excellent channels of communication which nature has provided to unite them. Without the aid of these the bulky articles which make up the returns of the Indian market, could never be taken out. The country being remarkably flat, that roads are excessively bad in winter; and in the summer, the immense prairies to the west and north of this, produce such myriads of flies as to render it impossible to make use of pack horses. Hence it follows, that a few well situated positions on the straits which unite the lakes on the Mississippi, and on the communications which connect the latter with the former, would completely control the Indian trade, and consequently the Indians themselves. I suppose that the forces to be stationed at Detroit, ought, in some measure, to be regulated by that kept by the British, in the neighboring fortress of Malden. This has, I believe, for several years, not exceeded two weak companies, and is at present reduced to one.
Dawson, Moses
William H. Harrison:
p. 132.
The fort at Detroit can have little or no influence in controlling the Indian trade, because it does not command the strait; and if it did, much the greater part of the trade is now, and the whole could be carried on by the land route of the Grand river. The proper position for our object is, therefore, to be sought for higher up. In case of a war between the United States and Great Britain, she could never think of defending Upper Canada, and no valuable purpose could be answered by a temporary possession of Detroit and the neighboring settlements. I can, therefore, see no good reason for an accumulation of force at this point.
A strong regular work, to be garrisoned by two companies, but capable of accommodating a battalion, would, I should imagine, be amply sufficient. It would be highly desirable to have the fort to command the ship channel of the strait.
When I was at Detroit in 1803, the British had, and I believe still have, six or seven armed vessels, carrying from eight to twenty-two guns, on lake Erie. With a part of this force, and with the assistance of the Indians, Mackinac would be easily reduced; as, from its insular situation, no reinforcements or supplies could reach it if the enemy should possess the superiority of naval force on the upper lakes; to prevent this, it will be necessary either to build a number of vessels equal to theirs, or, by fortifying the river of Detroit, confine them to lake Erie. A situation proper for this was the object of my enquiry, and Hog island, two miles above Detroit, was pointed out as the most eligible; there is, also, another favorable situation for commanding the navigation on the strait below lake St. Clair and lake Huron.*
As the canoe route of the Grand river and lake Nepissin, to its entrance into lake Huron, is entirely within the British territory, the post of Mackinac is of considerable importance. It is here, and at the neighboring British post of St. Joseph's, that the valuable trade which is borne along the route above mentioned, and that which comes by the way of Detroit, is parcelled out for the various directions which it afterwards assumes. In the event of a war with the British, it will be their first object to furnish the tribes who espouse their cause, with a sufficiency of arms and ammunition, to render them independent of any supply from us for several years.
The post of Mackinac, with the aid of one or two small armed vessels, would be a great check to the throwing in these supplies; but it could only be stopped entirely by erecting a work at the rapid of St. Mary's, the pass leading into lake Superior. This route into the Mississippi is not so good a one as that by Green Bay, Fox river, and Ouisconsing; but the one being
*This is the site of Fort Gratiot, erected during the War.
Dawson, Moses
William H. Harrison:
p. 133.
secured, and the other open, would expose us to the same mischiefs as if neither were guarded.*
For the peace establishment of Mackinac, one disciplined complete company, under a vigilant officer, would be sufficient. Of all the communications between the lakes and the Mississippi, that from lake Michigan by the Fox and Ouisconsing rivers, is the most used, and the most interesting and important. It is through this channel, that nine tenths of the goods for the supply of the Indians above the Illinois river and Louisiana are conveyed, and until we have a military force upon it, we can never control either the traders or the Indians. I was so sensible of this, that in a treaty which I made at St. Louis, in 1804, with the Sacks and Foxes, I inserted a clause authorising the United States, to build a fort on either side of the Ouisconsing, or on the opposite bank of the Mississippi, as the one or the other should afford the best site.
I am convinced that great advantage would arise from a company being stationed there. The village of Prairie du Chien, consisting of about thirty French families, is three miles above. The fort lately erected on the Mississippi, near the mouth of Desmoine, will serve as an intermediate post as support to that on the Ouisconsing. The site of the latter is, I am informed, extremely bad, being commanded by higher ground within musket shot.
The post of Chicago is an important one. From its position, it secures the communication between lake Michigan and the Mississippi by means of a short creek on which the fort stands, and which actually takes rise in the same lake or swamp with the Illinois river; so that, in the spring, boats with their loading pass freely from one to the other. The site of Fort Wayne was selected by General Washington. To erect a fort there was the object of General St. Clair's campaign. Its accomplishment by General Wayne, and a further knowledge of the country, sufficiently evinced the wisdom of the choice. Proceeding from Fort Wayne to the Wabash, and down that river at the distance of 150 miles from Fort Wayne, and 180 from this place, is the site of the old Wea towns, where there is a considerable reservation of lands, made by the treaty of Greenville, for a fort. The situation is beautiful, and, besides commanding the Wabash, is near the mouth of the Tippecanoe, which, discharging itself into the former, has its source in the neighborhood of the Illinois and St. Joseph's of lake Michigan; to each of which there is a portage of nine to fourteen miles, much used by the Indians, and sometimes by traders. Notwithstanding these advantages, I would not recommend the building of a fort there. I think, however,
*Both these positions have been occupied since the peace. At St. Mary's strong work has been erected, and a still stronger one at Green Bay, which is the head quarters of a regiment.
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