| Chapter X: pp. | 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, | |
| 349, 350, 351, 352, 353. |
344 |
The Treaty of Fort Wayne of September 30, 1809 (7 Stat. 113) between the Delawares, Potawatomis, Miamis, and Eel River Indians and the United States, represented by William Henry Harrison, Governor of Indiana Territory and commissioner of the treaty, made the cessions of land to the United States which are now designated as Royce Areas 71, 72, and 73.1 Royce Area 71 was ceded to the United Staten with the proviso that the Wea Indians had to approve the cession; Royce Area 73 was ceded to the United States with a proviso that the Kickapoos had to approve the cession.
The Treaty was initiated by Harrison in May, 1809.2 In a
letter to the Secretary of War, Harrison stated that White settlement at
Vincennes was cramped by nearness of Indian lands, and that the good
lands of the Vincennes Tract (Royce Area 26) had already been settled.
More lands were needed, if the White settlements around Vincennes were
to develop and grow strong. Harrison expressed his belief that there was
no more danger of Indian hostilities in Indiana Territory, and that the
Shawnee Prophet's forces were dispersed and weak. He wrote that for
several years he had considered it desirable, and he thought that the
Indians would readily accede to the purchase by the
2. Between August 21, 1805, when he made the Treaty of Grouseland
whereby the Miamis, Eel Rivers and Weas ceded Royce Area 55 (see
Chapter 6, this Report) and 1809 Harrison had negotiated only one other treaty. This was a treaty made with the Piankashaws on December 30,
1805 (7 Stat. 100) in which the Piankashaws ceded a large tract in the
present State of Illinois now referred to as Royce Area 63 (ibid.,
pp. 672-673, Illinois 1, Pl. 17).
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United States of the Indian lands lying northeast of the Vincennes Tract, extending from the Wabash to the boundary of lands purchased at the Treaty of Grouseland in 1805 (Royce Area 56).3
Two months later, in July, 1809, Harrison reaffirmed the desirability of acquiring the above-mentioned lands, in his report to the Secretary of War on the military needs of the United States in the area north and west of the Ohio River. He suggested that the military post of Fort Knox, then located at Vincennes, would be more effective in controlling the area if it were relocated farther upstream on the Wabash, beyond the existing northern boundary line of the Vincennes Tract (Royce Area 26).4
The Secretary of War, after cautioning Harrison not to disturb the Indians
unduly in order to acquire the lands under consideration, sent him on July
15, 1809, the President's authorisation to proceed with the purchase. The
Secretary instructed Harrison to choose a favorable moment, not to pay
more than was usual for the lands, and to include as participants at the
treaty "Chiefs of all nations who have or pretend right to these lands" in
order to prevent future dissatisfaction.6
4. Harrison to the Secretary of War, Vincennes, July 5, 1809; Dft. Ex. 119.
5. Indiana Historical Collections, vol. 7, p. 347; Dft. Ex. 97.
6. Secretary of War to Harrison, War Department, July 15, 1809; Dft. Ex. 100. The Secretary of War's instructions may have had something to do
with Harrison including the Potawatomis
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Harrison had attempted to learn the Indians' opinions about the proposed Treaty, and had tried to gain their consent to participate in such a Treaty, before he received official instructions to proceed. At Harrison's instigation John Johnston, Indian Agent at Fort Wayne, Indiana, held a conference on June 21-23, 1809 with "the Miamies" about the proposed purchase of lands on the Wabash. The chiefs agreed at this conference to treat with Harrison at Vincennes in August.7
Therefore, on August 23, 1809 Harrison issued a proclamation against the sale of liquor to Indians in or within 30 miles of Vincennes, during the Treaty council.8 By August 29, 1809 however, he had determined to hold the Treaty at Fort Wayne rather than at Vincennes, partly because the former location afforded
a situation infinitely more eligible to treat with them [the Indians] than this,
where the facility of procuring spirits and the constant intrusion of bad men
amongst them would probably render them unmanageable.9
7. Fort Wayne Agency, Letterbook, April 15, 1809-Oct. 1, 1815, p. 22; Dft. Ex. 132.
8. Indiana Historical Collections, vol. 7, p. 357; Dft. Ex. 97.
9. Carter, Territorial Papers, vol. 7, pp. 670-671; Dft. Ex. 69.
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Another reason for holding the Treaty at Fort Wayne was that Harrison had decided to negotiate for an additional tract of land that he had "neglected to mention" to the Secretary of War and which he wanted to see in order to decide where the Treaty lines should be drawn. Harrison wrote about this tract that it "appears to be even more desireable and necessary than 10 that which has been approved."10
Harrison had tried to acquire this "desireable" tract during the negotiations of the Treaty of Grouseland of August 21, 1805, but had been blocked when one of the chiefs at Grouseland had refused to sign the Treaty until the proposed cession was eliminated. This chief had succeeded in persuading "a majority of the other chiefs to accept his opinion." 11 The cession,which was later called the Twelve Mile Purchase (Royce Area 72), was desirable to White settlers because it would enable the very narrow northern part of Dearborn County, Indiana Territory, to be expanded and to develop.12
Harrison was uncertain what tribes he would include as parties to his proposed Treaty, but he planned to treat with Miamis, Potawatomis, and Delawares, at least.
The Weas and Kickapoos (if I should ultimately determine
to admit the latter
11. Indiana Historical Collections, vol. 7, pp. 164-165; Dft. Ex. 97. Harrison had attempted to get the area from the Miamis at the Treaty of Grouseland, and give in return a permanent annuity to the Delawares, instead of the 10-year one they had. He had been led to propose this because the Miamis had refused to recognize they had given the Delawares right of soil to the White River lands.
12. Carter, Territorial Papers, vol. 7, pp. 670-671; Dft. Ex. 69.
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to the Treaty) I will assemble upon my return at such a distance above
this place Vincennes as to put them out of the way of bad advisers.13
The Indian Agent, John Johnston, invited the Indians to be at Fort Wayne
by September 16. Governor Harrison with his retinue arrived on September
15.15 Various groups of Delawares, Potawatomis, and Miamis
arrived at Fort Wayne between the 15th and the 19th of September, but
several influential Delaware and Potawatomi chiefs were either at
Detroit, or were delayed by illness. Harrison in the meantime held
preliminary conferences with different Indian groups, refused to
distribute liquor, and suppressed a rumor that Government troops
were
14. See Chapter 7 on Indian Use and Occupancy of Area 71, and Chapters 2, 3, and 4 for the locations of the various groups in historic times.
15. Fort Wayne Agency, Letter Book, April 15, 1809-Oct. 1, 1815, pp. 27,
28; Dft. Ex. 132.
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about to attack the Indians.16
On September 18, 1809 Harrison had a conference with a
Deputation from the Deliwares who reside west of the Mississippi who came for the purpose of prevailing on those of that Tribe who reside in this Territory to join their brethren in Louisiana. A reciprocal promise wan made by the Governor to promote the above object as much as possible and by the Chiefs to aid his views in respect to the proposed Treaty. . . Measures were taken also to explain the wishes of the Government to the Putawatimies & to engage their cooperation.17
the great advantage which they would derive from causeing the Weas to move from the neighborhood of our Settlements [the Vincennes Tract] and join their brethren the Miamies & Eel River Tribes (these three tribes are all properly speaking Miamies see the Treaty of Grouseland)18 for the reason that Their Nation would then become much more respectable and they would be enabled greatly to increase their annuity by selling a Tract of land which was exausted of game and which was no longer useful to them19Later during the night of September 20, 1809 William Wells, an interpreter in the negotiations and a former Indian Agent
17. Ibid., p. 10; Dft. Ex. 131.
18. Article 4 of the Treaty of Grouseland of August 21, 1805 (7 Stat. 91) states that the Miamis, Eel River and Weas "were formerly and still consider themselves as one nation. . ." This remark occurs in the 1805 Treaty as an explanation (not historically valid; see Chapters 2, 3, 4, this Report) of why the three groups wanted the United States to recognize their ownership of certain lands in common.
19. Journal of Proceedings, p. 11; Dft. Ex. 131.
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at Fort Wayne, who had remained with the Miami and Eel River Indians during their deliberations reported to Harrison that the Indians had decided not to cede any of their lands.20
On September 21st Harrison talked to the Delawares and Potawatomis to correct their impressions of what the government desired at these negotiations, and that night the Potawatomi chiefs
sent a message to the Governor to inform him that they had determined
that the other Tribes should agree to make the proposed cession.21
remnant of the Weas who inhabit the Tract of Country which was wanted [who] were from the vicinity to the Whites poor & miserable all the proceeds of their hunts & the great part of their annuities expended in Whiskey. The Miami Nation would be much more respectable & formidable if its scattered members were all assembled in the center of their Country.It would, Harrison reasoned, be to the advantage of both the Weas and Miamis if the area bordering on the Wabash north of
21. Idem.
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the Vincennes Tract (Royce Area 26) and the tract ceded at the Treaty of Grouseland (Royce Area 56) were ceded by the Indians to the United States.22
The Indians were then shown a rough sketch of the tracts of land which Harrison desired, and with this the meeting adjourned.23
The 23rd of September was spent by the Indian chiefs considering Harrison's proposition in council at the Delaware camp. It was understood by Peter Jones, Harrison's secretary at the Treaty, that in this meeting the Potawatomis were in favor of the sale and that the Delawares were also, but that the Miamis remained silent.24
Little Turtle, a Miami chief, after being reassured that Wells' removal as Indian Agent would not affect his (Little Turtle's) standing with the Government, assured Harrison that he would work to gain the cession for the Governor. One great difficulty to be overcome, Little Turtle stated, was the complaint of the Indians that they had not formerly received enough compensation, and those in favor of the Treaty now wanted $1,000 additional annuity for the larger tribes and $500 for the smaller ones, as well as a cash settlement.25
That evening the Miami chiefs spent the evening with the Governor and
took some liquor home to the other Indians. Late in the evening a
Potawatomi chief visited Harrison to tell him
23. Ibid., p. 13; Dft. Ex. 131.
24. Idem.
25. Idem.
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that the Indians would agree to his proposal.26
The Indians met again on September 24, 1809 to decide about their answer to Harrison. In this meeting the Miamis declared they would not sell any more land and that it was time to put a stop to White encroachment and the selling of land for less than it was worth. Also, the Miamis had heard that the Governor had no official instructions to make the proposed purchase. The Potawatomis replied that they
had always agreed to the sale of lands for the benefit of the Miamies andThe Delawares took no part in this argument.27
they were now determined that the Miamies should sell for their benefit.
The Governor met this opposition the next day (September 25, 1809) by
appealing to the Indians' sentiments, and by expressions of approval
directed to the Delawares and Potawatomis for their stand in favor of the
sale. He reiterated to the Miamis the advantages they would derive
from annuities and from the consolidation of the Weas with
them, and assured the Indians that this was the only request
for lands that their "new Father," President Madison, would
make of them. If some of the chiefs wanted to visit the President, they
would hear the same from him.28
27. Ibid., p. 14; Dft. Ex. 131.
28. Ibid., pp. 14-15; Dft. Ex. 131. Later, three Delaware chiefs wanted to go to Washington, but Harrison tried to dissuade them. See Harrison to the Secretary of War, Vincennes, November 3, 1809; Dft. Ex. 152.
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On the evening of September 25th Miami chiefs from two villages, together with the Eel River chiefs, met and agreed to accede to the Governor's request for the cession of the lands.29
On September 26, 1809 the Indian groups met again. The Potawatomis urged acceptance of the Treaty, but the Mississinewa Miamis vigorously opposed them and influenced those Miamis who had been in favor of the cession, to oppose it. The Potawatomis violently denounced the Mississinewa Miamis, and threatened to go to war against them if they did not accede to the Treaty. This meeting of September 26 ended in an impasse. It was suggested by Peter Jones, Harrison's secretary at the Treaty, that the Mississinewa Miamis had been much influenced by British agents in opposing the Treaty.30
That evening Harrison
had the greater part of the Miami chiefs at his lodgings and in a conversation of some hours exposed profidious conduct of the British towards them from the commencement of the Revolutionary War untill the present moment. 'To them all their misfortunes were to be attributed & their present kindness to them proceeded from no other cause but a wish to embroil them with the United States. In case of a War with the latter, the English know that they are unable to defend Canada with their own force, they are therefore desirous of interposing the Indians between them and danger.'31
30. Idem.
31. Ibid., pp. 16-17; Dft. Ex. 131.